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Demand	   response	   is	   a	   cornerstone	   problem	   in	   electricity	   markets	   under	   climate	   change	  
constraints.	   Most	   liberalized	   electricity	   markets	   have	   a	   poor	   track	   record	   at	   encouraging	   the	  
deployment	  of	  smart	  meters	  and	  the	  development	  of	  demand	  response.	  In	  Europe,	  different	  models	  
are	   considered	   for	   demand	   response,	   from	   a	   development	   under	   a	   regulated	   regime	   to	   a	  
development	  under	  competitive	  perspectives.	  In	  this	  paper	  focusing	  on	  demand	  response	  and	  smart	  
metering	  for	  mid-­‐size	  and	  small	  consumers,	  we	  investigate	  which	  types	  of	  market	  signals	  should	  be	  
sent	  to	  demand	  managers	  to	  see	  demand	  response	  emerge	  as	  a	  competitive	  activity.	  Using	  data	  from	  
the	   French	   power	   system	   over	   nine	   years,	  we	   compare	   the	   possible	  market	   design	   options	  which	  
would	  enable	   the	  development	  of	   demand	   response.	  Our	   simulations	  demonstrate	   that	  under	   the	  
current	  market	  rules	  demand	  response	   is	  not	  a	  profitable	  activity	   in	  the	  French	  electricity	   industry.	  
Introducing	   a	   capacity	  market	   could	   bring	   additional	   revenues	   to	   demand	   response	   providers	   and	  
improve	  incentives	  to	  put	  in	  place	  demand	  response	  programs	  in	  a	  market	  environment.	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Physical	  equilibrium	  between	  generation	  and	   load	   in	   real-­‐time	  has	  always	  been	  a	  key	   issue	   for	  
the	   power	   system	   operator	   because	   this	   energy	   cannot	   be	   stored	   economically	   on	   a	   large	   scale.	  
Without	   storage,	   equilibrium	   in	   real-­‐time	   has	   been	   traditionally	   managed	   thanks	   to	   a	   flexible	  
portfolio	  of	  different	  generation	  units.	  Meanwhile,	  demand	  response	  has	  been	  used	  by	  incumbents	  
to	  balance	   their	   power	   system	   since	  quite	   a	   long	   time.	   For	   instance,	   there	  were	  6	  GW	  of	  demand	  
response	   in	   France	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1990's	   while	   there	   were	   only	   3.5	   GW	   in	   2007	   (CRE,	   2013).	  
Demand	   response	   is	   becoming	   now	   more	   interesting	   with	   the	   development	   of	   smart	   grid	  
technologies.	  With	   these	   new	   technologies,	   the	   potential	   capacity	   of	   demand	   response	   in	   France	  
could	  reach	  10	  to	  15	  GW	  (E-­‐cube,	  2013).	  The	  market	  rules	  are	  hence	  evolving	  in	  different	  countries	  
to	   ease	   the	   integration	  of	   demand	   response	   in	   the	   power	  market	   (e.g.	   in	   France	   –	   RTE,	   2013	   –	   in	  
Belgium	  –	  CREG	  et	  al.,	  2014	  –	  or	  in	  the	  USA	  –	  Hurley	  et	  al.	  2013).	  	  
The	  main	   interest	  of	  demand	  response	   is	  that	   it	  participates	   in	  balancing	  the	  power	  system	  for	  
some	  hundreds	  of	  hours	  a	  year	  in	  the	  same	  way	  peak	  generation	  does	  (Faruqui	  &	  Earle	  2006;	  Faruqui	  
&	   Sergici	   2010;	   	   Faruqui	   -­‐	   Harris	   &	   Hledik	   2010).	   Demand	   response	   has	   been	   capturing	   attention	  
because	  most	  liberalised	  power	  systems	  with	  an	  ‘energy	  only’	  market	  are	  characterised	  by	  a	  deficit	  
of	  investment	  in	  peaking	  units,	  caused	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  revenue.	  This	  so-­‐called	  “missing	  money”	  problem	  
have	  now	  been	  widely	   studied	   (see	   Joskow	   (2007,	   2008)	   Cramton	   and	   Stoft	   (2006)	   and	   Finon	   and	  
Pignon	  (2008)	  for	  an	  in-­‐depth	  survey).	  The	  solutions	  to	  address	  the	  peaking	  unit	  missing	  money	  issue	  
include	   a	   range	   of	  market	   arrangements,	   such	   as	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   strategic	   reserve	   of	   power	  
plants	   owned	   (e.g.	   in	   Finland)	   or	   contracted	   by	   the	   system	   operator	   (e.g.	   in	   Belgium),	   capacity	  
payments	  (in	  Italy	  or	  Argentina)	  or	  capacity	  markets	  (in	  different	  markets	  in	  the	  USA,	  in	  PJM,	  ISO-­‐NE	  
or	  NY-­‐ISO).	  Different	  countries	  have	  tried	  different	  arrangements	  (see	  Finon	  and	  Pignon	  (2008);	  see	  
also	   Stamtsis	   and	   Lynchnaras	   (2015)	   for	   a	   description	   of	   the	   national	   capacity	   remuneration	  
mechanisms	  in	  the	  European	  Union)	  and	  Khalfallah	  (2011)	  proposed	  a	  model	  for	  generation	  capacity	  
adequacy	  that	  allows	  comparison	  between	  investment	  incentive	  mechanisms	  in	  electricity	  markets.	  
But	  assuming	  that	  demand	  response	  can	  be	  a	  substitute	  for	  peak	  generation	  invites	  us	  to	  analyse	  
the	   potential	   impact	   of	   the	   missing	   money	   problem	   on	   demand	   response	   solutions.	   To	   test	   the	  
existence	  of	  this	  “missing	  money	  for	  demand	  response”	  hypothesis,	  we	  will	  try	  to	  evaluate	  this	  gap	  
using	  empirical	  data	  from	  the	  French	  power	  market	  over	  nine	  years.	  By	  doing	  so	  we	  contribute	  to	  the	  
debate	  on	  the	  challenges	  the	  smart	  grids	  and	  demand	  response	  investment	  programs	  will	  undergo	  in	  
the	  future	  (Allcott	  2011	  ;	  Joskow	  2012).	  	  
	  	  
3	  
Our	  simulations	  show	  that	   the	   ‘missing	  money’	   issue	   in	  current	  power	  markets	   is	  very	   likely	   to	  
affect	  demand	  response	  aggregators	  and	  to	  make	  the	  recovery	  of	   the	  upfront	   investment	   in	  smart	  
metering	   infrastructures	   difficult	   to	   recoup	   through	   market	   revenues	   without	   additional	   capacity	  
remuneration.	  We	  will	  then	  wonder	  which	  market	  design	  could	  foster	  the	  development	  of	  demand	  
response	   toward	   small	   (domestic	   and	   tertiary)	   consumers,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   which	   types	   of	   market	  
signals	   should	   be	   send	   to	   demand	   managers	   to	   see	   demand	   response	   emerge	   as	   a	   competitive	  
activity	  solving	  the	  missing	  money	  issue.	  In	  Europe,	  demand	  response	  is	  considered	  as	  a	  new	  vector	  
to	   foster	   competition	   and	   liquidity.	   To	   the	   contrary,	   because	  of	   the	   subsidiarity	   of	  Member	   States	  
with	  regard	  to	  their	  energy	  policy,	  the	  diversity	  of	  policies	  supporting	  Renewable	  Energy	  Sources	  for	  
Electricity	  (Finon	  and	  Perez,	  2007;	  Henriot,	  2015,	  Saguan	  and	  Douguet,	  2013)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  diversity	  
of	  capacity	  remuneration	  mechanisms	  (ACER4,	  2013;	  Glachant	  and	  Henriot,	  2014;	  Veyrenc,	  2014)	  and	  
the	   integration	   of	   interconnection	   capacity	   in	   those	   mechanisms	   are	   seen	   as	   obstacles	   to	   the	  
integration	   of	   the	   European	   electricity	   market	   and	   the	   development	   of	   competition	   (European	  
Commission,	  2015a	  &	  b).	  
The	  paper	   is	   structured	  as	   follows:	  we	   first	   specify	   the	  economics	  and	   technical	   characteristics	  
that	   distinguish	   demand	   response	   from	   peak	   generation.	   Then,	   we	   highlight	   the	   problem	   of	  
compensation	   that	  a	  demand	   response	  program	  would	  experience	  on	  a	  power	  market.	  At	   last,	  we	  
study	   the	   matching	   between	   the	   incentive	   mechanisms	   implemented	   to	   ensure	   sufficient	   peak	  
generation	   investment	  and	   the	   specificities	  of	  demand	   response.	  We	  conclude	  about	   the	  ability	  of	  
pure	   liberalized	   market	   solution	   to	   provide	   sufficient	   incentives	   for	   the	   development	   of	   demand	  
response.	  	  
2 The	  parallel	  between	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  and	  a	  peak	  generator	  
A	  demand	  response	  program	  and	  a	  peak	  generator	  face	  a	  number	  of	  similar	  issues,	  including	  the	  
“missing	  money”	   problem	   observed	   in	  most	   liberalized	   power	  markets.	   But	   there	   are	   also	   several	  
significant	  differences	   to	  be	  highlighted.	   In	   this	   section,	  we	  demonstrate	   that	  both	   similarities	   and	  
differences	   in	   issues	  met	   should	  be	   taken	   into	  account	  when	  evaluating	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  missing	  
money	  issue	  on	  the	  profitability	  of	  a	  demand	  response	  program.	  2.1 Similarities	  between	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  and	  a	  peak	  generator	  
In	  order	   to	  determine	  when	  one	  can	   substitute	   for	   the	  other,	  we	   review	   the	  different	   services	  
provided	  by	  a	  peak	  generator	  and	  discuss	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  can	  be	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4	  
used	  as	  an	  alternative.	  	  
First,	  a	  peak	  generator	  is	  scheduled	  day-­‐ahead	  to	  supply	  energy	  during	  the	  peak	  demand	  hours	  
only.	  Indeed,	  a	  peak	  generator	  has	  the	  highest	  marginal	  cost	  and	  is	  the	  last	  type	  of	  generation	  units	  
to	  be	  planned	  and	  started	  up	  to	  supply	  energy.	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  peaking	  generator	  is	  dispatched	  after	  
all	   other	   units	   to	   meet	   the	   residual	   demand	   makes	   its	   revenues	   very	   hard	   to	   predict	   and	   very	  
uncertain.	  An	   investment	   in	  a	  peak	  generator	   is	   thus	  very	   risky	  because	   it	  depends	  on	   the	   level	  of	  
power	   demand	   that,	   itself,	   depends	   on	   extreme	   weather	   conditions.	   For	   a	   power	   system	   that	  
experiences	  high	  levels	  of	  demand	  during	  the	  heating	  season,	  a	  very	  cold	  year	  means	  that	  the	  peak	  
generators	  run	  for	  a	  large	  number	  of	  hours.	  Conversely,	  a	  warm	  year	  means	  that	  they	  may	  not	  run	  at	  
all,	  being	  then	  unable	  to	  pay	  back	  the	  annuity	  of	  their	  investment	  during	  the	  year5.	  	  
A	  peak	  generator	  is	  also	  very	  useful	  to	  balance	  the	  power	  system	  in	  real	  time	  (providing	  ancillary	  
services)	   or	   close	   to	   real	   time	   (providing	  power	  on	   the	  balancing	  market).	   These	   second	  and	   third	  
uses	  of	  a	  peak	  generator	  are	  related	  to	   its	  characteristics	  of	  high	  flexibility	  and	  short	  start-­‐up	  time.	  
This	  feature	  is	  very	  valuable	  in	  real	  time	  to	  balance	  generation	  and	  load	  in	  an	  industry	  where	  storage	  
is	   not	   possible.	   Indeed,	   the	   time	   to	   react	   to	   an	   imbalance	   in	   real	   time	   is	   short,	   from	   seconds	   to	   a	  
maximum	  of	  15	  minutes6.	  A	  peak	  generator	  is	  adapted	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  power	  balance	  within	  this	  
time	  period	  because	  it	  is	  very	  flexible	  once	  started-­‐up,	  and	  it	  is	  able	  to	  be	  started	  up	  quickly.	  Indeed,	  
peak	  generators	  or	  hydro	  generators	  with	  dams	  are	  the	  main	  generators	  to	  be	  used	  to	  act	  in	  such	  a	  
short	  delay7.	  	  
A	  demand	  response	  program	  can	  replace	  a	  peak	  generator	  only	  for	  two	  of	  the	  uses	  listed	  above,	  
on	  a	  daily	  basis	  and	  for	  adjustments.	  A	  load	  curtailment	  can	  be	  planned	  day-­‐ahead	  when	  load	  is	  high	  
to	   help	   and	   balance	   supply	   and	   demand.	   A	   load	   curtailment	   can	   be	   activated	   in	   real	   time	   to	  
compensate	  imbalances.	  	  
	  2.2 Differences	  between	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  and	  a	  peak	  generator	  
A	   demand	   response	   program	   and	   a	   peak	   generator	   are	   not	   pure	   substitutes	   for	   four	   reasons.	  
First,	   a	   load	   curtailment	   can	  only	  happen	   if	   demand	  was	  planned	  and	   if	   the	   curtailment	   itself	  was	  
anticipated	   with	   sufficient	   notice.	   For	   the	   moment,	   to	   avoid	   any	   disturbance	   for	   the	   consumers,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  same	  reasoning	  applies	  in	  a	  similar	  manner	  for	  power	  systems	  that	  experience	  high	  levels	  of	  demand	  during	  the	  
warm	  season	  like	  in	  the	  USA	  due	  to	  an	  intensive	  use	  of	  air	  conditioning.	  
6	   The	   automatic	   ancillary	   services	   must	   react	   in	   seconds	   or	   minutes	   during	   fifteen	   to	   twenty	   minutes	   after	   the	  
disturbance.	  After	  more	  than	  fifteen	  minutes	  of	  imbalances,	  the	  capacity	  of	  ancillary	  services	  must	  be	  restored	  so	  that	  the	  
power	  system	  can	  support	  any	  new	  imbalances.	  This	  requires	  that	  a	  generator	  be	  started	  up	  (or	  that	  a	  demand	  response	  
operator	  curtail	  load)	  in	  less	  than	  15	  minutes.	  
7	   The	   provision	   of	   ancillary	   services	   is	   generally	   risk-­‐free	   because	   a	   part	   of	   the	   remuneration	   is	   associated	   to	   the	  
availability	   of	   capacity.	   However,	   the	   activity	   of	   adjustment	   in	   real	   time	   implying	   starts-­‐up	   is	   risky	   for	   a	   peak	   generator	  
because	  its	  use	  depends	  on	  uncertain	  imbalances.	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curtailment	  in	  the	  residential	  sector	  mainly	  concerns	  energy	  uses	  with	  inertia	  such	  as	  the	  production	  
of	  cold	  or	  heat.	  However,	  these	  energy	  uses	  with	  inertia	  are	  only	  active	  when	  demand	  is	  high8.	  	  
The	  second	  difference	  is	  the	  Cold	  Load	  Pick-­‐Up	  (CLPU)	  effect.	  The	  CLPU	  is	  the	  additional	  energy	  
and	  power	  temporarily	  needed	  to	  compensate	  the	  previous	  curtailment.	  The	  two	  main	  parameters	  
of	  the	  CLPU	  effect	  are	  its	  size	  and	  its	  duration.	  These	  characteristics	  are	  essential	  to	  the	  profitability	  
of	   a	  demand	   response	  operator.	   If	   the	   level	  of	   the	  CLPU	  effect	   is	   smaller	   than	  100%,	   any	  demand	  
curtailment	  saves	  energy	  and	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  induce	  money	  savings9.	  The	  smaller	  the	  CLPU	  effect	  is,	  
the	   higher	   the	   money	   savings	   are.	   Figure	   1	   illustrates	   a	   CLPU	   effect	   of	   100%	   (which	   means	   the	  
curtailment	  does	  not	  modify,	  neither	  increasing	  nor	  decreasing,	  the	  energy	  consumption)	  and	  lasting	  
twice	  the	  time	  of	  the	  curtailment.10	  
	  














Planned load Curtailment CLPU effect (50% - same duration as the curtailment) Realised load 	  
	  
The	   third	   specificity	   of	   a	   demand	   response	   program	   is	   that	   it	   is	   an	   intermediated	   tool	   of	  
management	  and	  not	  a	  direct	  decision	  taken	  by	  a	  company	  11.	  This	  characteristic	  makes	  the	  business	  
model	   complex	   for	   the	   deployment	   of	   demand	   response	   (Albadi	   &	   El-­‐Saadany,	   2008;	   EUDEEP	  
business	  model	   1).	   In	  most	   demand	   response	   programs,	   the	   demand	   response	   operator	   does	   not	  
directly	  curtail	  its	  customers	  but	  only	  sends	  them	  a	  price	  signal	  telling	  them	  that	  they	  should	  curtail.	  
The	  customers	  then	  have	  to	  react	  to	  price	  signals	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  their	  other	  constraints.	  Thus,	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Load	  is	  high	   in	  warm	  weather	  for	  power	  systems	  with	  many	  air	  conditioners	  or	   in	  cold	  weather	  for	  power	  systems	  
with	  many	  electric	  heaters.	  
9	   Conversely,	   any	  CLPU	  effect	   above	  100%	  means	   that	   any	  demand	  curtailment	   induces	  a	   global	   increase	   in	  energy	  
consumption	  and	  higher	  energy	  expenses.	  
10	  See	  Agneholm	  (1999)	  for	  a	  quite	  broad	  characterization	  of	  the	  CLPU	  effect.	  	  




is	  difficult	  for	  a	  demand	  manager	  to	  predict	  and	  commit	  to	  a	  response	  rate	  among	  its	  customers	  and	  
therefore	  the	  actual	  capacity	  of	  its	  demand	  response	  program.	  
Some	  operators	  then	  choose	  to	  sell	  controlled	  demand	  response	  programs.	  The	  operator	  takes	  
care	  of	  the	  direct	  curtailment	  of	  its	  customers	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  do	  not	  feel	  any	  disturbance12.	  
However,	   this	   solution	   has	   two	   drawbacks.	   First,	   the	   operating	   costs	   of	   the	   demand	  manager	   are	  
much	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  previous	  solution,	  because	  of	  the	  establishment	  and	  operation	  of	  a	  demand-­‐
side	  management	  dispatching,	  which	  will	  manage	  the	  curtailment	  of	  all	  customers.	  Then,	  even	  with	  a	  
controlled	  demand	   response	  program,	   the	   consumer	  always	  has	   the	   right	   to	  overrule	   the	  order	  of	  
curtailment	   and	   to	   continue	   to	   consume	   electricity.	   The	   rate	   of	   response	   from	   consumers	   to	   a	  
curtailment	  order	  will	  never	  be	  100%,	  and	  it	  may	  vary	  on	  a	  wide	  range.	  It	  was	  measured	  between	  9%	  
and	   53%	   in	   the	   North	   East	   of	   the	   USA	   in	   2009	   (Cappers,	   Goldman,	   &	   Kathan,	   2009).	   Demand	  
response	  aggregators	   can	  nevertheless	   limit	   these	  problems	  playing	  with	   the	  big	  number	  effect	  of	  
their	  portfolio	  of	   consumers	   that	   they	   can	   curtail	   in	  order	   to	  make	   their	   (curtailing)	   capacity	  more	  
reliable.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  increases	  their	  fixed	  costs	  because	  they	  must	  then	  increase	  their	  customer	  
base.	  Recent	  measures	  present	  more	   interesting	  performances	  between	  65%	  and	  130%	   (Hurley	  et	  
al.,	  2013).	  
Last,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  entry	  and	  exit	  of	  customers,	  as	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  is	  
a	   commercial	   activity	   that	   caters	   to	   residential	   or	   tertiary	   customers.	   Therefore,	   the	   demand	  
response	   capacity	   of	   an	   operator	  may	   vary	   over	   time	   depending	   on	   the	   dynamics	   of	   its	   customer	  
base.	  
Considering	   the	   intermediated	   nature	   of	   demand	   response	   for	   small	   and	   medium	   size	  
consumers,	   it	   may	   be	   difficult	   for	   such	   a	   demand	   response	   program	   to	   provide	   ancillary	   services	  
when	   needed.	   The	   provision	   of	   secondary	   reserves	   implies	   that	   the	   respondent	   receives	   a	   signal	  
displayed	  by	  the	  TSO	  itself	  over	  a	  dedicated	  telecommunication	   infrastructure.	   If	  demand	  response	  
provided	   secondary	   reserves,	   this	   would	   impose	   that	   this	   dedicated	   infrastructure	   be	   extended	  
toward	  the	  curtailed	  consumers.	  Nevertheless,	  experiments	  are	  carried	  out	  so	  that	  demand	  response	  
can	   produce	   ancillary	   services	   (e.g.	   MacDonald	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   RTE,	   2014a).	   The	   ability	   of	   demand	  
response	   to	  produce	  ancillary	   services	  depends	  on	   the	  nature	  of	  curtailed	   load	  and	  could	   focus	  on	  
some	  industrial	  processes	  and	  mainly	  commercial	  activities	  (Ma	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  demand	  response	  aggregators	  implement	  so	  called	  cascading	  and	  cyclical	  demand	  curtailment.	  In	  
other	  words,	  different	  electrical	  devices	  are	  curtailed	  in	  a	  cyclical	  manner	  on	  the	  consumer	  site	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  the	  impact	  
on	  its	  comfort.	  And	  these	  devices	  are	  stopped	  one	  after	  another	  ("cascading")	  only	  if	  it	  is	  needed	  to	  curtail	  a	  big	  amount	  of	  
power	  (ADEME,	  2002).	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2.3 A	  “missing	  money”	  issue?	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  renewal	  or	  extension	  of	  peak	  generation	  units,	  several	  liberalized	  power	  markets	  
have	  experienced	  low	  level	  of	  investment.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  insufficient	  revenue	  these	  investors	  are	  
receiving	  from	  the	  energy-­‐only	  market	  and	  the	  risk	  they	  perceive	  from	  the	  market	  prices,	  since	  they	  
are	  paid	  for	  only	  several	  hundreds	  of	  hours	  in	  a	  year	  and	  with	  great	  variations	  from	  a	  year	  to	  another	  
(Joskow,	  2008).	  Several	  hours	  per	  year,	  the	  market	   is	  so	  tight	  that	  the	  spot	  price	  soars	  and	  blithely	  
exceeds	   several	   thousand	   euros/MWh	   (Joskow,	   2008).	   This	   scarcity	   rent	   is	   very	   important	   for	   the	  
peak	   generators	   because	   it	   allows	   them	   to	   cover	   their	   investment	   costs	   during	   their	   few	  hours	   of	  
operation.	   In	   the	   extreme	   case	   where	   demand	   is	   greater	   than	   generation,	   prices	   even	   reach	   a	  
threshold	   at	  which	   some	   consumers	   prefer	   to	   disappear	   spontaneously	   rather	   than	   to	   pay	   for	   the	  
asked	  price.	  This	  threshold	  is	  generally	  noted	  “VoLL”	  for	  Value	  of	  Lost	  Load.	  	  
Many	   regulators	   however	   see	   this	   very	   high	   price	   as	   a	   market	   failure	   or	   as	   a	   politically	  
unbearable	  price	   situation.	  To	   solve	   this	  problem,	   some	   regulators	   set	  a	  price	  cap	   that	   the	  market	  
price	  can	  never	  exceed,	  as	  shown	  on	  figure	  2.	  This	  price	  cap	  then	  limits	  the	  income	  generated	  by	  the	  
peak	  generator	  and	  reduces	  the	  incentive	  to	  invest	  in	  such	  peaking	  units.	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  
the	  price	  cap	  will	  have	  the	  same	  effect	  for	  the	  remuneration	  of	  a	  demand	  response	  operator	  that	  is	  
only	  remunerated	  through	  the	  energy-­‐only	  market.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2	  Missing	  money	  emerging	  from	  price	  cap	  (Hogan,	  2007)	  
	  
	  
All	   these	   considerations	   lead	   to	   the	   identification	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   revenue,	   the	   so	   called	   “missing	  
money”	   for	   any	   facility	   (peak	   generator	   or	   demand	   response)	   acting	   during	   the	   peak	   hours.	   A	  
classical	   solution	   to	   fill	   the	   gap	   is	   to	   pay	   them	   for	   their	   availability	   and	   not	   only	   for	   the	   energy	  
production	  or	  curtailment.	  A	  peak	  generator	  would	  then	  be	  paid	  for	   its	  availability	  during	  the	  peak	  
hours	  and	  for	  its	  production	  when	  dispatched.	  And	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  would	  then	  be	  paid	  
for	   its	  availability	  during	   the	  peak	  hours	  and	   for	   the	  effective	  undergone	  curtailment.	  According	   to	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the	  solutions	  chosen	  in	  the	  national	  market	  designs,	  peak	  generators	  had	  more	  or	  less	  difficulties	  to	  
recover	  their	  investment	  costs.	  	  
However,	  given	  the	  four	  characteristics	  of	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  (appearance	  only	  when	  
demand	   is	  high,	  CLPU	  effect,	   control	  and	  dynamics	  of	  customer	  base),	  a	  market	  design	  adapted	   to	  
the	   development	   of	   peak	   generation	   may	   not	   necessarily	   be	   adequate	   for	   the	   deployment	   of	  
demand	  response.	  	  
3 The	  need	  to	  pay	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  for	  availability	  
The	   implementation	   costs	   of	   demand	   response	   for	   the	   big	   industrial	   consumers13	   and	   the	   big	  
tertiary	   consumers14	   are	   quite	   low	   and	   adapted	   to	   load	  management	   (5,000	   to	   10,000	   €/MW	   for	  
investment15,	  3,000	  to	  12,000	  €/MW.year	  of	  operational	  expenditure	  and	  possibly	  activation	  costs16).	  	  
In	  these	  situations,	  the	  existing	  information	  and	  communication	  assets	  allow	  easily	  to	  command	  load	  
and	   the	   potential	   volume	   of	   demand	   response	   is	   high.	   Nevertheless,	   for	   the	   small	   tertiary	   and	  
domestic	   consumers	   that	   stand	   for	   the	   biggest	   possibility	   for	   demand	   response17,	   it	   is	   needed	   to	  
develop	   a	   new	  and	  dedicated	   infrastructure18.	   The	   implementation	  of	   demand	   response	   programs	  
that	  can	  follow	  the	  hourly	  variations	  of	  the	  electricity	  market	  price	  then	  requires	  these	  old	  metering	  
devices	   to	   be	   replaced	   and	   a	   demand	   control	   centre	   to	   be	   developed	   to	   aggregate	   the	   individual	  
demand	   response	   capacities	   into	   a	   demand	   response	   volume	   big	   enough	   to	   be	   traded	   on	   the	  
marketplace	  (Albadi	  &	  El-­‐Saadany,	  2008;	  Faruqui	  &	  Sergici,	  2009).	  	  
This	   new	   infrastructure	   requires	   a	   large	   upfront	   investment	  with	   uncertainty	   on	   the	   costs	   and	  
returns	  (Haney,	  Jamasb	  and	  Pollitt	  2009).	  For	  instance	  in	  France,	  the	  “Linky”	  program	  to	  deploy	  smart	  
meters	   is	  evaluated	  between	  4	  and	  8	  billion	  euros	   for	   the	   installation	  of	  30	  million	  new	   intelligent	  
metering	   devices19.	   This	   new	   infrastructure	   being	   brand	   new,	   to	   our	   knowledge,	   no	   detailed	  
information	   is	   available	   to	   evaluate	   the	   extent	   of	   economies	   of	   scale	   and	   thus	   the	   competitive	   or	  
regulatory	  nature	  of	  demand	  response	  program.	  	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  evaluate	  the	  potential	  missing	  money	  problem	  for	  Demand	  Response.	  First,	  we	  
focus	  on	  the	  two	  main	  revenue	  sources	   for	  a	  peak	  generator,	  either	  the	  spot	  day-­‐ahead	  market	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  They	  generally	  stand	  for	  30%	  of	  total	  consumption.	  
14	   The	  main	   function	  of	   a	  Building	  Management	  System	   is	   to	  manage	   the	  environment	  within	   the	  building	   (cooling,	  
heating,	  air	  distribution,	  lighting...)	  to	  obtain	  the	  desired	  temperature,	  carbon	  dioxide	  levels,	  humidity,	  brightness,	  etc.	  	  
15	  Source	  :	  Marchand-­‐Maillet	  (2012).	  
16	  Source	  :	  E-­‐Cube	  (2013).	  
17	  They	  jointly	  stand	  for	  the	  remaining	  70%	  of	  total	  consumption.	  	  
18	   Smart	  metering	   devices	   can	   help	   the	   development	   of	   demand	   response	   but	   their	   first	   objective	   is	   to	   reduce	   the	  
metering	  and	  losses	  costs	  of	  network	  operator.	  
19	   To	   widen	   the	   range	   of	   possible	   cost,	   a	   French	   independent	   demand	   response	   aggregator	   pretends	   that	   its	  
investment	  costs	  are	  20	  times	  smaller	  than	  the	  investment	  cost	  of	  a	  peaker.	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the	  balancing	  market.	   Second,	  we	  evaluate	   the	   revenue	   that	   can	  be	  expected	   from	   these	  markets	  
and	  we	  extract	  general	  conclusions	  using	  data	  from	  the	  French	  case.	  	  3.1 Two	  markets	  to	  buy	  and	  sell	  electricity	  	  
Liberalised	   power	   markets	   actually	   consist	   in	   a	   sequence	   of	   closely	   connected	   markets	   with	  
different	   time	   horizons,	   from	   forward	  markets	   years	   ahead	   to	   real-­‐time	  markets.	   A	   producer	   can	  
choose	   to	   sell	   its	   electricity	   mainly	   on	   two	   different	   markets:	   a	   market	   said	   "Spot"	   or	   day-­‐ahead	  
market,	  and	  a	  balancing	  market	  used	   to	  compensate	   for	   real-­‐time	   imbalances	  between	  generation	  
and	  load	  (Saguan	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  
In	  France,	   the	  spot	  day-­‐ahead	  market	   is	   run	  by	   the	  Power	  Exchange	  “EPEXSpot”20.	  Each	  day	  at	  
11:00,	  a	  market	  player	  may	  submit	  voluntary	  offers	  on	   this	  exchange:	   for	  every	  hour	  day-­‐ahead,	   it	  
may	  offer	  a	  buy	  or	  sale	  bid21.	  Since	  2013,	   it	   is	  also	  possible	  to	  value	   load	  curtailment	   in	  the	  energy	  
market,	   i.e.	  either	  on	  the	  organised	  EPEXSpot	  market	  or	  over-­‐the-­‐counter	  with	  other	  market	  actors	  
and	  not	  exclusively	  in	  the	  supplier's	  portfolio	  whose	  load	  is	  curtailed	  (RTE,	  2013).	  As	  for	  the	  balancing	  
market,	   it	   is	  a	  tool	  for	  the	  Transmission	  System	  Operator	  (TSO)	  to	  ensure	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  power	  
system	   in	   real	   time.	   Each	   player	   in	   this	   market	   bids	   upward	   or	   downward.	   In	   case	   of	   system	  
imbalance,	  the	  TSO	  asks	  for	  the	  balancing	  market	  and	  selects	  some	  bids	  to	  balance	  back	  generation	  
and	   load.	  The	  balancing	  market	   is	  also	  completed	  by	   the	  ancillary	   services	   (primary	  and	  secondary	  
reserves)	  that	  allow	  rapid	  automatic	  balancing.	  The	  provision	  of	  ancillary	  services	  can	  be	  regulated	  or	  
organised	   as	   a	   market.	   The	   remuneration	   that	   generators	   receive	   from	   the	   provision	   of	   ancillary	  
services	   is	   quite	   small	   compared	   to	   the	   remuneration	   provided	   by	   the	   day-­‐ahead	   and	   real	   time	  
markets.	  	  
For	  instance,	  in	  France,	  the	  average	  yearly	  cost	  of	  ancillary	  services	  is	  less	  than	  1	  €/MWh	  (with	  an	  
annual	  cost	  around	  300	  million	  €	  to	  serve	  around	  450	  million	  MWh)	  compared	  to	  the	  average	  peak	  
spot	  price	  of	  electricity	  close	  to	  60€/MWh	  on	  EPEXSpot22	  (CRE,	  2010).	  
These	  day-­‐ahead	  and	  real-­‐time	  markets	  are	  in	  France	  and	  in	  most	  of	  the	  European	  countries	  the	  
main	   sources	   of	   remuneration	   for	   different	   electricity	   generators,	   after	   the	   bilateral	   market.	   A	  
generator	  with	  a	  winning	  bid	  on	  the	  Spot	  Market	  is	  paid	  the	  spot	  price.	  A	  generator	  with	  a	  winning	  
bid	  on	  the	  balancing	  market	  is	  generally	  paid	  its	  bid	  price.	  Let	  us	  now	  see	  the	  distinct	  impact	  of	  these	  
two	  systems	  of	  remuneration	  on	  a	  demand	  response	  program.23	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Previously	  called	  PowerNext	  until	  2009.	  	  
21	  Intraday	  trade	  is	  also	  possible	  on	  EPEXSpot,	  but	  these	  exchanges	  represent	  a	  much	  smaller	  volume	  than	  
in	  day-­‐ahead.	  
22	  Source:	  CRE,	  2010.	  Observatoire	  du	  marché	  de	  gros	  de	  l’électricité.	  1er	  trimester	  2010.	  	  
23	  Transmission	  constraints	  are	  integrated	  in	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  or	  real	  time	  prices	  paid	  to	  the	  winning	  bids.	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3.2 The	  need	  to	  remunerate	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  for	  its	  availability	  
Considering	   the	   similarities	   and	   differences	   between	   a	   demand	   response	   program	   and	   a	   peak	  
generator,	  the	  objective	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  would	  be	  
profitable	   in	   an	   “energy-­‐only”	  market	   context	   applying	   previous	   analyses	   of	   this	   problem	   for	   peak	  
generators	  to	  the	  case	  of	  a	  demand	  response	  program.	  	  3.2.1 Cost	  estimations	  
In	   order	   to	   tackle	   our	   problem,	   we	   consider	   two	   polar	   scenarios	   for	   the	   estimation	   of	   the	  
different	  costs:	   the	  optimistic	   scenario	   is	  built	  using	   the	  most	  positive	  data	   set	  and	   the	  pessimistic	  
scenario	  is	  conversely	  calculated	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  less	  enthusiastic	  assessments.	  	  
We	  use	  the	  following	  set	  of	  information	  to	  estimate	  the	  cost	  of	  demand	  response	  on	  the	  smaller	  
consumers.	   E-­‐cube	   (2013)	   indicates	   the	   different	   types	   and	   values	   of	   costs	   for	   demand	   response	  
aggregators.	   The	   cost	   of	   installing	   a	   box	   to	   command	   load	   curtailment	   is	   estimated	   at	   450	   €	   per	  
customer	  depreciated	  over	  eight	  years.	  There	   is	  also	  a	   fixed	  cost	  of	  50	  €	  per	  year	  and	  customer	  to	  
cover	   the	   costs	   of	   telecommunication	   of	   the	   box	   and	   the	   customer	   management.	   Besides,	   it	   is	  
estimated	   that	   2	   to	   4	   kW	   per	   customer	   can	   be	   curtailment	   depending	   its	   characteristics.	   The	  
Weighted	  Average	  Cost	  of	  Capital	  (WACC)	  is	  estimated	  between	  10%	  and	  15%.	  	  
The	  optimistic	  scenario	  is	  hence	  obtained	  considering	  the	  lowest	  expected	  WACC	  (10%)	  and	  the	  
biggest	   amount	   of	   curtailment	   (4	   kW).	   To	   the	   contrary,	   the	   pessimistic	   scenario	   is	   obtained	  
considering	  the	  highest	  expected	  WACC	  (1%)	  and	  the	  smallest	  amount	  of	  curtailment	  (2	  kW).	  Table	  1	  
summarises	  the	  assumptions	  and	  the	  results	  of	  our	  calculation.	  	  
	  
Table	  1	  Assumptions	  of	  the	  optimistic	  and	  pessimistic	  scenarios	  	  
for	  the	  calculation	  of	  the	  investment	  cost	  of	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  











Optimistic	   50	   134	   4	   34	  
Pessimistic	  
	  
150	   2	   75	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Formula	   [E]	   [F]=[D]+[E]	   [G]	   [H]=[F]/[G]	  
	  
	  
We	   then	   compare	   these	   costs	   with	   the	   benefit	   that	   demand	   response	   could	   generate	   at	  
maximum	  from	  the	  market.	  For	  a	  matter	  of	  simplicity,	  we	  suppose	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  demand	  
response	   would	   not	   depreciate	   price.	   Both	   simplifications	   lead	   to	   optimistic	   evaluations	   since	   in	  
reality	   the	  use	  of	   full	   capacity	  of	  demand	  response	  may	  depend	  on	   the	   load	   level	  and	  may	   impact	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price	  level.	  	  
About	   the	   variable	   cost	   of	   demand	   response	   for	   a	   demand	   response	   operator	   targeting	   small	  
consumers,	   it	   requires	   to	   take	   into	   account	   that	   the	   demand	   response	   operator	   must	   pay	   the	  
supplier	  whose	  load	  is	  curtailed.	  When	  the	  consumer	  has	  contracted	  a	  fixed	  price	  rate,	  the	  demand	  
response	  operator	  must	  pay	   the	  consumer	   to	  award	  him	   for	   its	  efforts	  of	   curtailment	   (RTE,	  2011).	  
Besides,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  demand	  curtailment	  in	  real	  time,	  the	  generator	  must	  also	  be	  compensated	  
for	  its	  planned	  but	  unsupplied	  energy	  (see	  Glachant	  &	  Perez,	  2010	  for	  references).	  We	  assume	  that	  
in	   this	   case,	   the	   demand	   response	   aggregator	  must	   pay	   the	   supplier	   or	   directly	   the	   consumer	   50	  
€/MWh.	  	  	  
A	   last	  uncertainty	  about	  demand	  response	   is	  the	  cold	   load	  pick-­‐up	  effect.	  To	  avoid	  any	  case	  by	  
case	  study,	  we	  will	  assume	  that	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  CLPU	  effect	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  related	  
demand	  curtailment.	  We	  will	  then	  consider	  three	  levels	  of	  CLPU	  effect,	  first	  0%	  (no	  CLPU	  effect),	  50%	  
and	  100%.	  	  3.2.2 Estimations	  of	  the	  revenue	  of	  a	  demand	  response	  operator	  	  
A	  demand	  response	  operator	  can	  cumulate	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  revenue	  from	  both	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  
market	   and	   the	   real	   time	   market,	   limiting	   thereby	   the	   problem	   of	   missing	   money.	   In	   reality,	   the	  
demand	  response	  operator	  would	  face	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  real	  time	  prices	  while	  wondering	  day-­‐
ahead	  whether	   to	   bid	   on	   the	   spot	  market	   or	   to	  wait	   and	   possibly	   bid	   on	   the	   real	   time	  market.	   In	  
order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  potential	  revenue	  from	  such	  a	  strategy,	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  demand	  response	  
operator	   perfectly	   anticipates	   the	   balancing	   prices	   day-­‐ahead	   and	   knows	   whether	   its	   bid	   will	   be	  
accepted	   in	   real	   time.	   The	   demand	   response	   operator	   is	   then	   able	   to	   make	   perfect	   arbitrage	  
between	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  market	  and	  the	  real	  time	  market.	  In	  particular,	  when	  it	  can	  earn	  more	  on	  the	  
day-­‐ahead	   market	   than	   on	   the	   real	   time	   one,	   it	   would	   decide	   to	   act	   in	   the	   former	   one	   at	   that	  
moment24.	  	  
Reasoning	  backward,	  we	  first	  detail	  its	  revenue	  from	  the	  balancing	  market	  in	  a	  given	  hour	  h	  of	  a	  
given	  day	  d.	  Knowing	  perfectly	  the	  balancing	  price	  at	  hour	  h,	   it	   is	  then	  able	  to	  know	  when	  its	  bid	  is	  
activated	   that	   is	   to	   say	  when	   its	   bid	   price	  p_Bd,h	   is	   lower	   than	   the	   balancing	   price	  p_BMd,h.	   In	   the	  
French	  system,	  it	  is	  paid	  its	  bid	  price	  p_Bd,h	  for	  the	  volume	  it	  offers.	  This	  volume	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  
its	  current	  decision	  to	  curtail	  load	  curtailmentd,h	  but	  also	  on	  the	  CLPU	  effect	  from	  previously	  curtailed	  
load	  CLPUEd,h-­‐1	  that	  should	  then	  be	  subtracted.	  It	  must	  also	  compensate	  the	  supplier	  for	  the	  energy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Or	  conversely	  the	  real	  time	  price	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  price	  when	  the	  latter	  is	  maximum,	  it	  would	  decide	  to	  
act	  in	  the	  real	  time	  market	  at	  that	  moment	  and	  search	  for	  the	  moment	  when	  the	  spot	  price	  is	  the	  second	  higher.	  
	  	  
12	  
supplied	   while	   the	   demand	   response	   operator	   is	   curtailing	   load	   (supplier_compensation25).	   The	  
following	  formula	  sums	  up	  the	  revenue	  for	  the	  demand	  response	  operator	   in	  the	  balancing	  market	  
when	  it	  decides	  to	  participate	  at	  hour	  h.	  	  
	  























The	  balancing	  responsible	  party	  whose	  perimeter	  includes	  the	  demand	  response	  operator	  must	  
also	  bear	  an	  imbalance	  cost	  due	  to	  the	  CLPU	  effect	  CLPUEd,h-­‐1	  it	  pays	  at	  the	  upward	  imbalance	  price	  




















The	  demand	  response	  operator	  can	  also	  earn	  money	  day-­‐ahead	  shifting	  load	  from	  peak	  time	  to	  
valley	  time.	  The	  optimised	  spot	  product	  we	  consider	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  proposed	  by	  RTE	  (2011)	  in	  
the	   framework	  of	   discussions	   about	   the	   characterisation	  of	   demand	   side	   response	   in	   the	  CURTE26,	  
the	  Committee	  of	  Users	  of	  the	  Electric	  Transmission	  Network,	  in	  order	  to	  calculate	  the	  marginal	  gross	  
gain	   of	   a	   demand	   response	   operator	   between	   2006	   and	   2008.	   RTE	   (2011)	   considers	   a	   theoretical	  
product	  optimised	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  This	  product	  could	  be	  the	  result	  of	  an	  aggregation	  in	  the	  portfolio	  
of	  a	  supplier.	  It	  is	  then	  less	  restrictive	  than	  a	  curtailment	  that	  would	  happen	  for	  a	  unique	  customer27.	  
The	  studied	  product	  is	  a	  1MW	  load	  curtailment	  activated	  1	  hour	  a	  day	  during	  the	  daily	  peak	  and	  with	  
a	  CLPU	  effect	  occurring	  optimally	  during	  the	  off-­‐peak	  time28.	  The	  revenue	  generated	  by	  this	  product	  
is	  basically	  equal	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  maximum	  hourly	  price	  p_DAd,hmax	  and	  the	  
day-­‐ahead	  minimum	  hourly	  price	  p_DAd,hmin.	   In	  our	   case,	  we	  have	   to	   take	   into	  account	   that	  higher	  
revenue	  can	  be	  generated	  from	  the	  real	  time	  market.	  The	  peak	  time	  hmax	  when	  load	  is	  shifted	  to	  the	  
valley	  time	  is	  then	  determined	  by	  the	  moment	  when	  the	  revenue	  from	  day-­‐ahead	  market	   is	  higher	  
than	  the	  expected	  revenue	  from	  the	  balancing	  market.	  This	  is	  given	  by	  the	  following	  formula:	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  It	  has	  to	  paid	  50	  €/MWh	  to	  the	  supplier	  in	  this	  case	  (see	  supra).	  
26	  In	  French,	  Comité	  d’Utilisateurs	  du	  Réseau	  de	  Transport	  d’Electricité.	  	  
27	  In	  this	  situation,	  the	  rebound	  effect	  would	  happen	  just	  after	  the	  curtailment	  period.	  	  
28	  RTE	  assumes	  the	  level	  of	  the	  CLPU	  effect	  to	  be	  75%.	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minh,dmaxh,dd DA_pDA_pDA_revenue −= 	  
Where	   { }d,hhmind,h DA_pmin	  =	  DA_p 	  













	  that	  such	  
	  
	  
Such	   a	   formula	   authorizes	   a	   demand	   response	   operator	   to	   benefit	   from	   high	   revenue	   on	   the	  
balancing	  market	  and	  on	  the	  remaining	  most	  interesting	  opportunity	  on	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  market.	  It	  can	  
be	   noticed	   that	   the	   imbalance	   payments	   are	   not	   considered.	   We	   assume	   here	   that	   the	   demand	  
response	  operator	  cannot	  anticipate	  the	  imbalance	  price	  and	  is	  fully	  risk-­‐taker	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  this	  payment.	  	  




h,dh,ddd payment_imbalanceBM_revenueDA_revenuerevenue_total 	  
	  
Considering	   these	   formulas	   detailing	   the	   revenue	   that	   a	   demand	   response	   operator	   can	   earn	  
from	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  and	  the	  real	  time	  market,	  we	  search	  for	  the	  bid	  price	  in	  the	  real	  time	  market	  that	  
would	   optimise	   its	   total	   revenue.	  We	   perform	   this	   calculus	   using	   data	   from	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  
French	  balancing	  market	   in	   summer	  2003	   to	   the	  end	  of	  2011	  and	  spot	  prices	   for	   the	  same	  period.	  
Table	  2	   summarises	   the	  prices	   that	  would	  optimise	   the	   cumulated	   revenue	  of	   a	  demand	   response	  
program	   arbitraging	   the	   real	   time	   and	   day-­‐ahead	   markets	   with	   the	   different	   values	   of	   the	   CLPU	  
effect.	  	  
	  
Table	  2	  Prices	  optimising	  the	  maximal	  expected	  revenue	  of	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  that	  
arbitrages	  the	  real	  time	  market	  and	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  market	  when	  the	  CLPU	  effect	  is	  respectively	  0%,	  
50%,	  100%	  
Value	  of	  the	  CLPU	  effect	  
Price	  optimising	  the	  real	  time	  revenue	  of	  the	  
demand	  response	  program	  	  
Optimised	  revenue	  between	  2003	  and	  
2011	  
0	  %	   79	  €/MWh	   329	  k€/MW	  
50	  %	   94	  €/MWh	   231	  k€/MW	  
100	  %	   95	  €/MWh	   220	  k€/MW	  
	  
With	  these	  prices,	  we	  obtain	  annual	  revenue	  ranging	  from	  12,000	  €/MW	  to	  60,000	  €/MW	  for	  the	  




Table	  3	  Average	  revenue	  from	  the	  arbitrage	  between	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  market	  and	  the	  real	  time	  
market	  for	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  the	  CLPU	  effect	  between	  2003	  and	  
2011	  
Average	  total	  revenue	  (k€/MW)	  from	  the	  arbitrage	  between	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  
market	  and	  the	  real	  time	  market	  for	  different	  levels	  of	  the	  CLPU	  effect	  
Year	  	   CLPU	  0%	   CLPU	  50%	   CLPU	  100%	  
2003	   22	   17	   17	  
2004	   18	   14	   12	  
2005	   39	   28	   27	  
2006	   46	   34	   35	  
2007	   37	   30	   28	  
2008	   60	   41	   38	  
2009	   35	   25	   23	  
2010	   33	   20	   22	  
2011	   37	   22	   19	  
	  
The	  three	  figures	  below	  illustrate	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  revenue,	  either	  from	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  market	  or	  
from	   the	   real	   time	   market	   respectively	   for	   the	   three	   considered	   values	   of	   the	   CLPU	   effect.	   They	  
compare	   it	   to	  our	  estimations	  of	   the	  annualised	  fixed	  costs	  of	  a	  demand	  response	  operator	  needs,	  




Figure	  3	  -­‐	  Comparison	  between	  the	  minimum	  annualised	  investment	  cost	  of	  a	  demand	  response	  
program	  and	  its	  annual	  revenue	  from	  the	  arbitrage	  between	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  and	  real	  time	  markets	  
between	  2003	  and	  2011	  	  
0%	  CLPU	  effect	   50%	  CLPU	  effect	   100%	  CLPU	  effect	  
	   	   	  
	   	   	  
	  
	  
The	   analysis	   of	   figure	   3	   shows	   that	   a	   demand	   response	   operator	   experiencing	   a	   CLPU	   effect	  
below	   50	   %	   would	   have	   earned	   a	   revenue	   between	   2005	   and	   2011	   from	   the	   perfect	   arbitrage	  
between	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  market	  and	  the	  real	  time	  market	  above	  the	  minimum	  required	  level	  to	  avoid	  
any	  problem	  of	  missing	  money.	  	  
This	   optimistic	   result	   should	   of	   course	   be	   tempered.	  We	   assume	   a	   perfect	   arbitrage	   between	  
day-­‐ahead	   and	   real	   time.	   This	   result	   encompasses	   risk	   for	   the	   business	   of	   any	   demand	   response	  
operator	   because	   it	   may	   not	   perfectly	   manage	   its	   bid	   on	   the	   two	   markets	   on	   an	   hourly	   base	   in	  
presence	   of	   uncertainties29.	   Besides,	   if	   its	   annual	   revenues	   are	   here	   higher	   than	   the	   minimum	  
needed	  revenue,	  they	  are	  still	  quite	  far	  from	  the	  less	  pessimistic	  level	  of	  the	  annualised	  investment	  
cost	  of	   a	  demand	   response	  operator	   (75	   k€/MW	  as	   calculated	   in	   table	  1).	   The	  problem	  of	  missing	  
money	  may	  then	  still	  remains	  with	  imperfect	  arbitrage	  between	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  market	  and	  the	  real	  
time	  market.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  For	  instance,	  an	  operator	  can	  anticipate	  low	  revenue	  with	  quite	  low	  uncertainty	  from	  the	  day-­‐ahead	  market	  hoping	  
for	  higher	  but	  more	  uncertain	  revenue	  from	  the	  real	  time	  for	  the	  same	  hour.	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4 Which	   solution	   to	   solve	   the	   missing	   money	   problem	   for	   a	   demand	   response	  
program?	  
Electricity	  markets	  currently	   implement	  different	  tools	   to	  solve	  the	  missing	  money	  problem	  for	  
peak	  generation.	  Some	  markets	  have	   implemented	  regulation-­‐oriented	  mechanisms	  to	  remunerate	  
peak	  generation	  while	  other	  regions	  have	  implemented	  market-­‐oriented	  mechanisms	  instead.	  Finon	  
and	   Pignon	   (2008)	   distinguish	   four	  main	   types	   of	   solutions	   to	   compensate	   for	   the	  missing	  money	  
problem:	  namely	  Strategic	  Reserves	  (detained	  by	  the	  system	  operator),	  Long	  Term	  Contract,	  Capacity	  
Payment	  and	  Capacity	  Market.	  Table	  4	   illustrates	   the	   three	   last	  options	   (since	   the	   first	  one	   implies	  
the	  vertical	  integration	  of	  peak	  generation	  with	  the	  system	  operator).	  
	  
Table	  4	  Tools	  to	  solve	  the	  missing	  money	  problems	  in	  different	  countries	  
	   Long	  term	  contracts	   Capacity	  payment	  
(whose	  variant	  with	  
flexible	  price)	  
Capacity	  obligation	  and	  
capacity	  market	  
Countries	   Portugal	  
Belgium,	  France	  before	  2016,	  
Britain	  before	  2015	  
Spain,	  Italy	  
Argentina,	  Chile,	  
Colombia,	  Peru,	  	  
USA	  regional	  markets:	  PJM,	  
New	  York,	  	  
New	  England.	  	  
Britain	  since	  2015	  
	  
To	   evaluate	   the	   match	   between	   these	   different	   capacity	   mechanisms	   and	   the	   distinctive	  
characteristics	  of	  demand	  response,	  the	  features	  that	  distinguish	  a	  demand	  response	  program	  from	  
peak	   generation	  must	   then	  be	   taken	   into	   account.	  We	  will	   present	   the	   listed	   tools	   from	   the	  most	  
integrated	  and	  regulated	  solutions	  to	  the	  more	  market-­‐oriented	  ones.	  We	  will	  evaluate	  the	  matching	  
between	  the	  above	  mentioned	  specificities	  of	  demand	  response	  program	  (in	  particular	  control	  and	  
dynamics	  of	  the	  customer	  base)	  and	  the	  different	  solutions	  to	  missing	  money,	  i.e.	  long-­‐term	  capacity	  
contracts,	  the	  capacity	  payments	  and	  finally	  the	  capacity	  markets.	  
In	  half	  of	  the	  power	  markets	  of	  the	  USA,	  each	  electricity	  supplier	  must	  be	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  to	  
the	  Independent	  System	  Operator	  (ISO)	  that	  it	  can	  withstand	  all	  the	  demands	  of	  its	  customers	  in	  case	  
of	   peak	   time	  plus	   a	   certain	  margin	   (Finon	  &	  Pignon,	   2008).	   It	   has	   three	   tools	   to	   achieve	   this	   goal:	  
1°	  its	  own	  generation	  capacity,	  2°	  the	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  it	  has	  with	  other	  producers	  in	  the	  area	  of	  
its	  ISO,	  3°	  some	  additional	  generation	  capacity	  rights	  that	  it	  may	  acquire	  or	  exchange	  on	  a	  dedicated	  
capacity	  market.	  
Indeed,	   capacity	   markets	   have	   been	   introduced	   in	   some	   USA	   regions.	   The	   producers	   can	  
exchange	   capacity	   credits	   on	   a	   market	   and	   are	   then	   compensated	   for	   the	   capacity	   they	   have	   (in	  
addition	  to	  the	  revenue	  they	  get	  from	  the	  energy	  market	  for	  their	  output).	  However,	  if	  a	  producer	  is	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not	  able	  to	  produce	   if	  need	  be	  the	  capacity	   for	  which	   it	  was	  paid;	   it	  will	   face	  very	  heavy	  penalties.	  
Overall,	  these	  capacity	  markets,	  once	  cured	  effectively	  of	  their	  infancy	  problems30,	  have	  proved	  to	  be	  
effective	  when	  mature.	  The	  capacity	  market	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  generators	  in	  the	  USA.	  Their	  revenue	  
from	   the	   capacity	   market	   is	   such	   that	   without	   this	   revenue	   for	   their	   capacity,	   a	   lot	   of	   producers	  
would	  have	  disappeared	  by	  now	  (Joskow,	  2008).	  	  
Experience	   with	   forward	   capacity	  markets	   since	   2007	   in	   PJM	   and	   New	   England	   demonstrates	  
that	   these	  markets	  have	  been	  very	  efficient	   in	  driving	   investment	   in	  demand	  response	  and	  energy	  
efficiency.	  In	  New	  England,	  demand	  response	  has	  increased	  from	  about	  0.6	  GW	  in	  2007	  to	  more	  than	  
3	  GW	  in	  the	  2010	  auction	  for	  capacity	  in	  2013	  (for	  a	  peak	  demand	  of	  28	  GW	  in	  2007).	  A	  similar	  trend	  
has	  been	  observed	  in	  the	  PJM	  capacity	  market	  where	  demand	  response	  has	  increased	  from	  1.5	  GW	  
in	  2007	  to	  more	  than	  14	  GW	  in	  the	  2011	  auction	  for	  capacity	  in	  2014	  (for	  a	  peak	  demand	  à	  145	  GW	  in	  
2007).	  
At	   the	   EU	   level	   and	   at	   the	   Member	   States	   level,	   the	   need	   for	   a	   capacity	   market	   is	   debated	  
without	  clear	  conclusion	  up	  to	  now	  (Finon	  &	  Pignon,	  2008).	  	  
To	  our	  understanding,	  the	  capacity	  market	  is	  the	  solution	  that	  fits	  the	  best	  the	  requirements	  for	  
the	  demand	  response	  program	  in	  an	  all	  market	  context.	  Indeed,	  the	  demand	  manager	  acting	  on	  the	  
capacity	   market	   can	   adjust	   its	   volume	   with	   the	   dynamics	   of	   its	   customer	   base.	   However,	   the	  
response	   rate	  of	   customers	   to	   the	   curtailment	   signal	   still	   remains	   a	  problem.	   For	   a	  non-­‐controlled	  
demand	  response	  program,	  this	  response	  rate	  can	  be	  low.	  Consequently,	  the	  demand	  manager	  can	  
never	  be	  paid	  for	  the	  full	  management	  capacity	  it	  has.	  	  
At	   last,	  as	   for	  any	  market,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  keep	   in	  mind	   that	  a	  new	  capacity,	  here	  a	  demand	  
response	  capacity,	  will	   find	   it	  difficult	  to	  develop	  if	  there	   is	  overcapacity.	  A	  transitory	  phase	  is	  then	  
needed	  for	  the	  market	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  it	  and	  get	  back	  to	  an	  overall	  capacity	  closer	  to	  its	  optimal	  value.	  
With	   this	   regard,	   a	   capacity	   market	   is	   also	   more	   efficient	   than	   other	   capacity	   remuneration	  
mechanisms	  because	  it	  avoids	  boom	  and	  burst	  cycles	  constantly	   indicating	  the	  required	  capacity	  to	  
the	  market	  participants	  (Hary	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  
5 Conclusion	  
	  
In	  this	  paper	  we	  wondered	  which	  market	  design	  (if	  any)	  could	  permit	  the	  merchant	  development	  
of	  demand	  response	  and	  smart	  metering.	  We	  answered	  this	  question	  considering	  the	  similarities	  (as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Roques	  (2008)	  showed	  that	  they	  could	  be	  volatile,	  disconnected	  from	  the	  energy	  market	  and	  focused	  on	  the	  short	  
run	  while	  related	  to	  long	  run	  with	  investment.	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for	  investment,	  use	  and	  economic	  function)	  between	  peak	  generation	  and	  demand	  response	  and	  the	  
difficulties	  experienced	  at	  the	  international	  level	  by	  peak	  generation	  for	  its	  revenue	  in	  a	  pure	  market	  
configuration	  and	  the	  solutions	  proposed	  by	  the	  electricity	  markets.	  	  
Studying	   the	   matching	   between	   the	   incentive	   mechanisms	   implemented	   to	   ensure	   sufficient	  
peak	   generation	   investment	   and	   the	   specificities	   of	   demand	   response,	  we	   found	   that	   the	   capacity	  
market	  is	  the	  solution	  that	  fits	  the	  best	  to	  the	  requirements	  for	  the	  demand	  response	  program	  in	  an	  
all	   market	   context.	   This	   is	   because	   it	   provides	   flexibility	   to	   the	   demand	   response	   operator	   while	  
ensuring	  a	  given	  capacity	  level	  to	  the	  TSO.	  	  
The	  study	  of	  the	  development	  of	  demand	  response	  program	  in	  the	  USA	  where	  capacity	  markets	  
are	  implemented	  confirms	  that	  demand	  response	  can	  develop	  in	  a	  competitive	  way	  when	  the	  market	  
design	   is	   adequate.	   Demonstrating	   that	   demand	   response	   can	   develop	   without	   regulatory	   action	  
with	   an	   adequate	   market	   design	   also	   leads	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   demand	   response	   and	   smart	  
metering	   can	   be	   competitive	   activities	   under	   the	   condition	   that	   an	   adapted	   market	   design	   is	  
implemented.	  	  
We	  see	  four	  further	  research	  directions	  that	  could	  complete	  our	  work.	  First,	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  major	  
participation	  of	  demand	  response	  in	  the	  power	  market	  could	  be	  integrated	  to	  have	  a	  more	  accurate	  
evaluation	  of	  the	  revenue	  of	  a	  demand	  response	  operator.	  Second,	  strategies	  could	  be	  developed	  to	  
maximise	   the	   revenue	   with	   temporal	   arbitrage	   between	   the	   day-­‐ahead	   and	   real	   time	   markets.	  
Besides,	  we	  could	  extend	  our	  analysis	  to	  the	  revenue	  that	  a	  demand	  response	  operator	  could	  receive	  
while	  doing	  load	  shifting	  integrating	  the	  rebound	  effect	  appearing	  when	  curtailed	  load	  gets	  back	  into	  
operation.	  At	   last,	  an	  important	  issue	  to	  be	  considered	  is	  the	  implementation	  of	  capacity	  market	   in	  
an	   interconnected	   system	   such	   as	   the	   European	   one.	   The	   national	   capacity	   market	   architectures	  
should	   be	   compatible	   if	   not	   harmonised	   and	   the	   interconnectors	   properly	   treated	   so	   that	   the	  
capacity	   markets	   incentivize	   the	   investors	   to	   effectively	   develop	   new	   generation	   and	   demand	  
response	  capacity	  in	  an	  optimal	  manner.	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